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RECENT CASE NOTES
BANKS AND BANKING-DEPOSrIS AFTER INSOLVENcY-T deposited money
in bank thirty minutes before closing time. The next day was a legal holi-
day, and on the following day, the bank was closed by the state bank com-
missioner. T sues to have the deposit declared a preferred claim. Held,
T must come in with the general creditors because there was no allegation
of fraud nor of insolvency of bank at time of deposit, presented by the
pleadings. Barger v. Stultz, Appellate Court of Indiana, Sept. 4, 1930, 172
N. E. 549.
The relation of banker and depositor, in general, is that of debtor and
creditor with no preference'being given to depositors over general creditors.
But most courts will give preference to the claim of one who deposits money
in a bank, known by its officers to be insolvent. The grounds for this are
that since the deposit was induced by the fraudulent representation of sol-
vency thru continuing business, a constructive trust arises. Pennington v.
Third Nat. Bank of Columbus, Ga., 77 S. E. 455, 104 Va. 674, 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 319. Furber v. Dane, 204 Mass. 412, 90 N. E. 859, 27 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 808. Barnard v. Black, Ind. App. 1930, 169 N. E. 872.
In order to establish a preferred claim it is necessary to prove, first the
actual insolvency of the bank and, second, knowledge of such insolvency on
the part of the bank officers. Barger v. Stultz, supra. The establishing of
these facts presents a difficult problem for the courts. Some decisions hold
that the mere fact that the bank is in difficulties is not enough to make its
receiving of deposits fraudulent, if its officers believe the bank has a chance
to recover. Dunlap v. Seattle Nat. Bank, 161 Pac. 364. Brennan v. Tilling-
hast, 201 Fed. 609, 120 C. C. A. 37. Other cases say insolvency is inability
to pay debts in the ordinary course of business as persons carrying on bank-
ing usually do. Steele v. Allen, 240 Mass. 394, 134 N. E. 401, 20 A. L. R.
203. A middle ground is that a bank is insolvent when all of its assets are
insufficient to meet its liabilities. Youmans v. State, 7 Ga. App. 101, 66
S. E. 383. Indiana has, apparently, never passed upon the point. There is
a decided split of authority as to whether or not knowledge of bank officials
necessary to impute fraud to the bank may be inferred from the actual fact
of insolvency. The weight of authority seems to be that the depositor must
prove the officials had actual knowledge of the insolvency at the time the
deposit was received. Furber v. Dane, supra; Fidelity and Deposit Co. v.
Kelso State Bank, 287 Fed. 828; Metropolitan State Bank v. Lloyd, 90 N.
Y. 630. Some courts will infer knowledge of banker from the surrounding
circumstances, White v. Poole, 272 S. W. 1021; especially in the case of a
private bank. In Re Silver, 208 Fed. 797. And where there was a statute
similar to Burns 1926 sec. 2479 making a receiving officer criminally liable
for banks receiving deposits while insolvent, and making failure of a bank
within 60 days (Indiana says 30) after receiving deposits, prima facie evi-
dence of the insolvency, the depositor was allowed a preferred claim even
though his complaint did not allege fraud. Hughes v. Martin, 81 Okla. 89,
196 Pac. 951; Meadowcraft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 303, 35 L. R. A.
176. Knowledge is usually inferred where the insolvency is caused by
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criminal acts of a bank official, Orme v. Baker, 74 Ohio St. 337, 78 N. E.
439, 113 A. S. R. 968; Somerville v. Beal, 49 Fed. 790. But not where the
defaulter is a minor officer, Perth Amboy Gas-Light Co. v. Middlesex Coun-
ty Bank, 60 N. J. E. 84, 45 Atl. 708. State v. Cadwaller, 154 Ind. 607, 57
N. E. 512, citing Meadoweraft v. People, supra, held that a banker is
presumed to know of the insolvency if by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence he could have ascertained it. But this was a criminal trial under
Burns 1926 sec. 2479. A more recent civil case, Barnard v. Black, supra,
seems to require actual knowledge of bank officers.
Another question in connection with holding a deposit after insolvency
as a preferred claim is to determine how far the deposit may be traced
into the general assets of the bank. What appears to be a majority of
the cases which treat the deposit as a constructive trust follow the analogy
of the old requirement of maintaining the identity of the trust res, and
refuse to give a preferred claim to the depositor if the deposit has been
mingled with the general funds of the bank. Pennington v. Third Nat.
Bank, supra; Sadler v. Belcher, 2 Moody & R. 489; Furber v. Steppens, 55
Fed. 17; Atkinson v. Rochester Printing Co., 114 N. Y. 168. Others say
the depositor must show that the identical money deposited had not been
paid out by the bank, Re North River Bank, 60 Hun. 91. Still others will
give the depositor a preferred claim only on proof that the identical money
deposited remains in the mass of the bank's funds in the receiver's hands.
Lake Erie & Western R. R. v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank, 65 Fed. 690. And
some will even allow depositors a preference out of all of the banks assets.
St. Louis Brewery Association v. Austin, 100 Ala. 313; Brennan v. Tilling-
hast, supra. Indiana holds with this latter doctrine even tho the courts
admit it to be the minority rule, and allow recovery even tho the deposit
has been used to pay debts or to buy property for the bank, so long as the
assets are greater than the deposit. Shopert v. Indiana Nat. Bank, 41 Ind.
App. 474, 83 N. E. 515. Reserve Loan Insurance Co. v. Dulin, (Ind. App.)
135 N. E. 590; State v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 71 Ind. App. 216, 124
N. E. 501; Winstandley v. Second National Bank of Louisville, 41 N. E.
957; Barnard v. Black, supra. The Indiana rule is in accord with the
modern tendency to disregard the old requirement of "earmarked money"
as a trust res and hold that if the money can be followed into the deposit,
there is sufficient identification. Perry on Trusts (Seventh Ed.) Vol. II,
p. 1405.
A final moot point is raised by the attempt to hold bank officers person-
ally liable for loss of deposits received by the bank after insolvency. Most
courts that have passed on the subject allow recovery against the official,
Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482; Miller v. Harvard, 95 Tenn. 407,
32 S. W. 305, at least to the difference between the deposit and the de-
positor's share of the bank's assets. Boker v. Ashe, 80 Tex. 356, 16 S. W. 36.
Again, a majority of the cases require affirmative proof that the officer
had actual knowledge of the insolvency. Duffy v. Byrne, 7 Mo. App. 417; St.
Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Johnson, 133 U. S. 566. But a strong minority will
admit constructive notice of the insolvency. Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12
N. E. 676. And where depositor has relied on a personal statement of the
officer as to bank's solvency, officer was held liable without further proof
of knowledge of insolvency. 117 N. C. 330, 23 S. E. 461.
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The question has never arisen in Indiana but the courts would probably
follow the rule of Bermard v. Black, supra, in requiring actual notice, al-
tho states having a criminal statute similar to Indiana's have held con-
structive notice sufficient. Hughes v. Mortin, (Okla.) 196 Pac. 951; State
v. Perry, 194 La. 1065, 90 So. 406.
J. S. G.
CONDEMNATION-PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPACE UNDER SIDEWALI-Ap-
pellant had built a ten story building on a corner, and with permission of
the city, by furnishing the proper support, built a vault under the side-
walk which was 181/ feet wide, extending the entire length of the building.
Wells were drilled in this basement, furnishing the buildings water supply,
the heating and lighting systems were installed therein and there were
several very valuable rooms for rental purposes. The city notified appel-
lant that ten feet of the sidewalk was to be taken for street purposes, and
that appellant must either fill in part of his basement, or furnish adequate
steel support. The loss of this space would greatly inconvenience appellant
as well as put him to considerable expense, and the alternative of furnish-
ing support would cost $12,500. Appellant claims property should be con-
demned by the city, and compensation given. Held, city may require evacu-
ation without compensation because the easement of the public is para-
mount to any private use of abutting owners, where fee is in the abutting
owner, and where the fee is in the municipality, the abutting owner could
have no more than a mere license, and revocable at will without compensa-
tion. Swain v. City of Indianapolis, Supreme Court of Indiana, 171 N. E.
871.
There are several questions which help in deterjmining this problem-
whether or not there is a difference between the use of servitude as a side-
walk and as a street, and whether the change from the use as a sidewalk
to that of a street for vehicular traffic is such an added burden as entitled
the owner of the fee to compensation. Also, there is the question as to
whether or not the easement extends below the surface of the street, and
last what are the peculiar rights of the public in an easement.
There is an abundance of authority to the effect that the street includes
all the easement from property line to property line, with no distinction
between that part used for pedestrian traffic and that used for vehicular
traffic, as it effects the burden on the servient estate. City of Kokomo v.
Mahan, 100 Ind. 242; Coburn v. New Telephone Co., 156 Ind. 90; Elliott
on "Roads and Streets," Vol. I, sec. 23. The courts go far in allowing added
uses of streets without considering it an additional servitude. In Magee
v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 127 the court held that placing of telephone poles
in curb constituted no additional servitude for which the owner of the fee
might be entitled to compensation. Still more liberal was the Massachu-
setts court in Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 69 N. E. 27, in holding that
where the city built a tunnel under the street to accommodate additional
traffic, necessitating the abandonment of many vaults and valuable usages
of abutting owners, there was no additional servitude and no taking without
due process of law. Cooly on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 556, says,
"When land is taken or deducted for a street it is unquestionably appro-
priated for all the ordinary purposes of a town street-not merely the
